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THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF LAND
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS *
EDWARD D. RE
THE LFX SITUS IN ANGLO-AmERICAN LAW
M ORE than a century ago, an outstanding American jurist
and law professor, Joseph Story, in what has become
a classic work on the Conflict of Laws, wrote the following
concerning the testamentary disposition of land:
"... [T]he doctrine is clearly established at the common
law, that the law of the place, where the property is locally
situate, is to govern as to the capacity or incapacity of the
testator, the extent of his power to dispose of the property,
and the forms and solemnities to give the will or testament
its due attestation and effect." ' In a footnote, adequately
documenting the statement in the text, Mr. Justice Story
quoted at length from Burge's Commentaries on Colonial and
Foreign Laws.2
On this point Mr. Burge wrote with particular certainty.
The power of making the alienation by testament is no less qualitas
rebus impressa, than that of making the alienation by contract. When
therefore the question arises, whether the immovable property may
be disposed of by testament, recourse must be had to the lex loci rei
sitae. That law must also decide, whether the full and unlimited
power of disposition is enjoyed, or whether it is given under restric-
tion. By the jurisprudence of England and the United States, a will
devising lands in England or the States, if the solemnities prescribed
* This article is the substance of a talk given by the author at, the 1952
Annual Breakfast of the Section of International and Comparative Law of the
American Bar Association in San Francisco, California.
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWs 786 (3d ed. 1846).2
BuRGF, COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS GENERALLY
AND IN CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER (1838).
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by the Statute of Frauds have not been observed, would be ineffec-
tual to pass those lands. 3
The same confidence in the certainty of the state of the law is
manifested in Wharton's Conflict of Laws wherein the author
states: "So far as concerns England and the United States,
real estate, to adopt our distinctive phraseology, in all juris-
dictions, and by an uninterrupted current of authority, is
held to be subject to the lea rei sitae. To cite cases to this
point would be superfluous." 4 Although many cases on this
question are in fact cited and discussed in the succeeding
pages of the treatise, their comparison with cases decided by
the civil law courts, makes it perfectly clear that the lea
loci rel sitac enjoys a much greater applicability in the
Anglo-American system. Professor Lorenzen has expressed
this thought by stating that "as regards real estate Anglo-
American courts have gone far in applying the law of the
situs." 5
There can be no doubt that both American 6 and Eng-
lish 7 authors on the conflict of laws consider it to be unques-
tionably established that the governing law concerning all
dispositions of realty is the leo loci rei sitae. Not only does
the leo situs govern the legal effect of a purported convey-
ance of realty, but it also determines all matters of succes-
sion, both testate and intestate.8
34 BURGE, COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL ANID FOREIGN LAWS 217 (1838).
4 1 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 607-608 (3d ed. 1905).
5 Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L. J. 736, 737 (1924).
62 BEALE, CONFLIcT OF LAWS 938-939 (1935). "It will be at once seen
that immovables, being unable to be taken away from the state in which they
are, must always in the last analysis be governed by the laws of that state.
Those laws alone can apply to the land since any contrary provision would be
given no effect by the courts and the executive officers of the state of situs.
It therefore follows that every question arising with regard to land is to be
governed by the law of the situs"' GOODRICH, CoN7uicr OF LAws 453 (3d
ed. 1949). "The general rule is that the validity and effect of a transaction
by which an interest in land is created or transferred is governed by the law
of the situs of the land." MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 32 (1901).
7 CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 721 et seq. (3d ed. 1949);
WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 10, 220 et seq. (5th ed. 1912).
8 Hood v. McGebee, 237 U. S. 611 (1915); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U. S.
433 (1921).
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II
SOME REASONS FOR SUPREMACY OF LEX SITUS
Even a cursory evaluation of some of the reasons under-
lying the applicability of the lew loci rei sitae to transfers of
realty will indicate that the rule is both expedient and neces-
sary. It is neither accident nor coincidence that favors the
lew situs, but rather, as has been stated, "[s]itus must, from
the very nature of property be the arbiter." 9 Whether land
be viewed as an actor or an immovable res, title to the land
is conferred by and subject to the law of the sovereignty
where it is located. It is obvious that by its presence in a
given state only that state is capable of exercising a posses-
sory title over the land. Just as someone in possession can
be ousted only by the authority of the law of that juris-
diction, no claimant can be placed into possession except
by resorting to the governmental authorities of that same
jurisdiction. This concept of power or "force of terri-
torialism" 10 stems inescapably from the concept of terri-
torial sovereignty. 1
This control of a state over realty located within its jur-
isdiction is most usually spoken of in terms of public policy.
It is stated that "each state has its fundamental policy as
to the tenure of land," 12 and hence it would not tolerate any
other state determining any matter affecting title to its land.
Whether the rationalization be in terms of "sovereignty" or
"public policy" 's it can be added that since, under our sys-
tem of jurisprudence, a court can transfer title only by an
in rem proceeding, such a proceeding can only be instituted
in a court of the situs.
Wharton summarily disposes of the applicability of the
law of the owner's domicile and the lea loci contractus (or
9 1 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 638 (3d ed. 1905).
10 See Rabel, Situas Problems in Enemy Property Measures, 11 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 118, 120 (1945).
"1 See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (U. S. 1812).
12 1 WHARTON, CONFLICr OF LAws 636 (3d ed. 1905).
'is See Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L. Q.
156 (1930) ; Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public, 25 VA. L. Ray. 37(1938) ; Note, The Public Policy Concept in the Conflict of Laws, 33 COL. L.
Rxv. 508 (1933).
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the law of the place where the will is executed in the case
of a testamentary disposition) as follows:
If the lex rei sitae be abandoned, there is no other law that
can be invoked. The law of the owner's domicil cannot, because,
first, the question generally is, who the owner is, which must be dis-
covered before the law of his domicil is applied; and secondly, where
there are two or more owners with different domicils, we must re-
sort to an arbiter outside of the domicil of either to determine which
domicil is to prevail. The lex loci contraclus cannot avail; for, when
a thing is contended for by parties claiming under hostile contracts
executed in different countries, here, also, an umpire is required;
and to assume that the lex loci contractus of either contract is to
prevail is to assume the very point in dispute.' 4
III
SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF LEx SITUS RULE
Notwithstanding the dogmatic assertions found both in
treatises and in the cases regarding the applicability of the
leo situs to matters affecting realty, the number of cases
where a different rule was urged is amazingly large."; As
one might expect, the alternative choice of law rule that was
urged, in wills devising land, involved either the law of the
domicile of the testator or the law of the place of execution
of the will. The lex situs, however, was uniformly held to
prevail. For example, the lex situs was held to determine:
(a) the formal requirements of the will; 10
(b) the number of witnesses required; 17
(c) the necessity for filing or recordation; 18
(d) the capacity of the testator to make the will; 19
14 1 WHARTON, CoN LIcr OF LAWs 638 (3d ed. 1905).
15 See cases cited in 1 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAws 611 et seq. (3d ed.
1905). See Note, 48 L. R. A. 133 et seq. (1913) ; 11 Am. JuR. 479 et seq.
(1937).6 Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608 (1883).
'7 White v. Greenway, 303 Mo. 691, 263 S. W. 104 (1924).
18 Keith v. Johnson, 97 Mo. 223, 10 S. W. 597 (1889); Kerr v. Moon, 9
Wheat. 565 (U. S. 1824).
19 Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y. 9 (1863) ; Woodville v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442,
81 So. 127 (1919); Dickey v. Vann, 81 Ala. 425, 8 So. 195 (1886). See Note,
2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 415 (1906).
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(e) the capacity of the devisee to take under the will; 20
(f) the legal power of the testator to devise as against
an unborn child; 21
(g) the power of a widow or other person to contest the
will; 22
(h) the revocation of the will by the birth of a child; 23
(i) the revocation of the will by the marriage of the
testator; 24
(j) the nature of the estate created; 25
(k) the application of the rule in Shelley's case; 26
(1) whether a remainder interest created was vested or
contingent; 27
(m) whether a sale of land devised operates as an
ademption; 2 and
(n) whether land devised is to be treated as equitably
converted into personalty.29
IV
CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY CONCERNING INTERPRETATION
OF WILL
Many other instances could be found indicating that the
law of the situs governs matters affecting the disposition of
land by will. In fact, cases can be found holding that the
law of the situs will also govern in the interpretation of the
20United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 (1876); STORY, CoNnIcT OF LAws
719 (3d ed. 1846). "Thus, if the laws of a country exclude aliens from hold-
ing lands, either by succession or by purchase, or by devise, such a title be-
comes wholly inoperative as to theni, whatever may be the law of the place
of their domicil."2 1Ensley v. Hodgson, 212 Ala. 526, 103 So. 465 (1925).2 2 Robertson v. Robertson, 144 Ark. 556, 223 S. W. 32 (1920).
23 Bloomer v. Bloomer, 2 Bradf. 339 (N. Y. 1853).
24 Cornell v. Burr, 32 S. D. 1, 141 N. W. 1081 (1913).
25DeVaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566 (1897); Thompson v. Penn,
149 Ky. 158, 148 S. W. 33 (1912).26 DeVaughn v. Hutchinson, supra note 25.
27 Williamson v. Youngs, 200 Iowa 672, 203 N. W. 28 (1925).
28 Phillips v. Phillips, 213 Ala. 27, 104 So. 234 (1925).
29 Ford v. Ford, 72 Wis. 621, 40 N. W. 502 (1888) ; Clarke v. Clarke, 178
U. S. 186 (1900) ; It; re Trustee Act, 22 Sask. L. R. 142 (Canada 1927).
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words used in the will.30 This phase of the problem has been
exhaustively treated by Mr. Crawford D. Hening who has
concluded that:
Public convenience requires that, in the case of rules of construction
as in the case of rules of property, the rules of the situs should gov-
ern. To secure the expeditious and safe transfer of titles to real
estate, it is far preferable that the law of the situs should be indis-
criminately applied to all wills of real estate, whatever be the domicil
of the testator, than that several wills, all containing the same lan-
guage and all devising real estate in the same jurisdiction or even
devising the same real estate at different dates, should be differently
construed by the court of the situs, according as the domiciles of the
testators established different rules of construction.31
Relying at least partially on the conclusions of the author
just quoted, Judge Goodrich writes that "l[t]here are good
reasons for referring this matter to the law of the situs of the
land." 32 No unanimity of opinion, however, can be found on
this matter either in England or in the United States.33 Both
the cases and the authors on the conflict of laws are divided. 34
Story urges that the law of the domicile of the testator should
govern.3 5  Professor Minor suggested that "the weight of
reason and authority is in favor of the rule that the inter-
pretation of a devise is to be governed by the law or usage
with which the testator is supposed to be most familiar
namely that of his domicil; and hence when he uses words
he must be presumed to have intended that they should be
used in the sense given them in his domicil, unless the con-
trary appears." 31 He further observed that the situs rule
"could not be applied" if the testator possessed lands in sev-
30 McCartney v. Osborn, 118 Ill. 403, 9 N. E. 210 (1886). See 6 HA.s-
BuRY, LAws OF ENGLAND 242 (2d ed. 1932).
31 Hening, Is the Construction of Wills Devising Real Estate Governed by
the Rides of Construction of the Doinicil of the Testator or by the Rides of
the Sitis of the Property?, 41 Am. L. REG. (x. s.) 623, 718 (1902). See also
Note, 2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 408, 443 (1906).
32 GoooRcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 509 (3d ed. 1949).
33See CHESHnRE, PRrVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 735 (3d ed. 1949).
34 See cases discussed in Hening, sipra note 31. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
CoNrLicT OF LAWS 419 (2d ed. 1951). "Construction of wills of realty should
be matter for the law of the situs . ..."
35 STORY, CoNFmcT OF LAWS 798-811 (3d ed. 1846).
36 MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 341 (1901).
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eral states which gave a different interpretation of the words
used, and disposed of them by the same language, since "it
could not be supposed that the testator would intend the
same clause to have different meanings with respect to dif-
ferent tracts of land." 7
Nevertheless, even the situation referred to by Professor
Minor has not deterred the courts from applying the lew loci
rule. In McCartney v. Osburn,8s which involved a devise of
lands situated in Pennsylvania and Illinois, the Supreme
Court of Illinois made the following significant statements:
While it was entirely competent for the Pennsylvania courts to con-
strue the will and determine the rights of the parties to the property
there, yet they could make no order, decree, or ruling with respect to
the legal effect of the will that would deprive this court of the right
to construe that instrument for itself, so far as it relates to lands in
this state. Where a testator, by a single will, devises lands, lying in
two or more states, the courts of such states will, respectively, con-
strue it, as to the lands situated in them respectively, in the same
manner as if they had been devised by separate wills. 39
It is true that in the decided cases where the question
presented dealt with the interpretation of a testamentary
disposition of realty the courts have not agreed, and cases
can be found "supporting either view." 40 It is also probably
true that this conflict of judicial opinion can even be found
within the same jurisdiction.41 As far as the present New
York view is concerned it seems accurate to state that the
New York Court of Appeals will favor the application of the
lex situs rule. In 1911, in deciding Monypeny v. Monypeny,42
wherein a testator domiciled in Ohio, devised lands located
in Ohio and New York, the New York court stated that
"[t]here can be no question that, though the will was made
7 Ibid.
38 118 Ill. 403, 9 N. E. 210 (1886).39 Id., 9 N. E. at 212.
40 GOODRICH, CoNvucr OF LAws 511 (3d ed. 1949). See also STUMBERG,
PRINCIPLFS OF CONFLIcr OF LAWs 419-426 (2d ed. 1951).
41 Monypeny v. Monypeny, 202 N. Y. 90, 95 N. E. 1 (1911); Matter of
Osborn, 151 Misc. 52, 270 N. Y. Supp. 616 (Surr. Ct. 1934); cf. N. Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Viele, 161 N. Y. 11, 55 N. E. 311 (1899); Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85
N. Y. 153 (1881).42202 N. Y. 90, 95 N. E. 1 (1911).
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in Ohio, its interpretation and effect, so far as it relates to
the real property within this state, is to be determined by
the courts of this state and that their decision is conclu-
sive." 13 If any doubt exists as to the view of the New York
Court of Appeals on this question, a reading of Matter of
Good 44 decided on April 23, 1952, will convince the skeptic.
Judge Conway, writing for a unanimous court, stated that
"[t]he common-law rule, as to which there appears to have
been no exceptions, was that the validity of a devise of real
property [situate in New York], and all questions relating
to the title to the property, were to be determined by the laws
and courts of New York regardless of the domicile of the
testator." 45 Immediately thereafter the judge wrote: "Sub-
sequently we codified the law in what is now section 47 of
the Decedent Estate Law." 46 The citation of authorities 47
in the decision will leave no doubt that the court considered
the lex situs to be the governing law concerning all questions
involving realty within the state. Since the devise in Matter
of Good pertained to land in several states the court agreed
with and quoted from the Illinois case of McCartney v.
Osburn A the statement to the effect that where a testator
devises by a single will lands located in several states the
courts of each state have the right to construe the will for
themselves as if the lands were disposed of by separate wills.
43Id. at 92, 95 N. E. at 1.
44304 N. Y. 110, 106 N. E. 2d 36 (1952).
45 Id. at 114, 106 N. E. 2d at 38 (emphasis added). The court cited White
v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 159 (1871), and Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y. 9, 11 (1863).
48 Matter of Good, supra note 44 at 114, 106 N. E. 2d at 38.
47 The court cited cases in support of the statement that "[tihe general
rule throughout the country was the same as our [the New York] common-
law rule." The court quoted from Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186, 191 (1900),
which in turn quoted from DeVaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566, 570 (1897) :
"It is a principle firmly established that to the law of the State in which the
land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation
and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other convey-
ances." Matter of Good, 304 N. Y. 110, 115, 106 N. E. 2d 36, 39 (1952).
48 See note 38 supra.
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RULES OF THE RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFIJCT
OF LAWS
Concerning matters relative to the validity and effect
of a devise found in a will the Restatement adopts the lea
loci rei sitae rule. Section 249 of the Restatement states the
general rule: "The validity and effect of a will of an inter-
est in land are determined by the law of the state where the
land is." 49 This rule is in harmony with the Restatement
position that makes the law of the situs the governing law
in matters affecting realty.50 For example, the lea situs
governs the conveyance of realty,51 capacity to convey, 52 for-
malities of conveyance, 53 validity of conveyance, 54 capacity
of grantee to take,55 effect of the conveyance, 6 nature of
the interest created,57 validity and effect of a mortgage,58
method and effect of foreclosure of a mortgage,59 creation
and effect of a lien, 60 or charge, 61 whether a person has an
equitable interest, 2 validity of a trust,6 3 and matters of devo-
lution upon the death of the owner.6 4
Concerning matters of interpretation and construction
Section 251 of the Restatement establishes rules that paral-
lel the rules applicable to the interpretation of a conveyance
of realty. 65  If the meaning of the language of the -will is
clear, the effect of such language in creating an interest in
4 9 RESTATEmxENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS §249 (1934). See also §8(1), com-
ment a.
5o Id. §§ 208-254.
51 Id. § 215.
52 Id. § 216.
5 Id. § 217.
5 Id. § 218.
55 Id. § 219.
56 Id. §220.
5 Id. § 221.
58 Id. §225.
59 Id. §227.
60 Id. 230.
61Id. §231.
62 Id. §239.
63 Id. § 241.
64 Id. §245.
65 Id. § 214.
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land is to be determined by the law of the situs. In the ab-
sence of any expression of intent on the part of the testator,
the will is to be construed according to the presumptions of
intent which prevail by the law of the situs. If the intent
of the testator, however, is not clear, in that he has expressed
his intent in language which is ambiguous under the leo
situs, the Restatement adopts the leo domicile rule. It states:
"The meaning of words used in a devise of an interest
in land . .. is, in the absence of controlling circumstances
to the contrary, determined in accordance with usage at the
domicile of the testator at the time when the will was
made." 66 This rule, however, establishes no more than a
presumption, and would not apply if there exist "controlling
circumstances to the contrary." 67 In no event could an in-
terpretation prevail which would lead to a result contrary
to the law of the situs.8 8
VI
STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS
Since some of the preceding common law rules may have
been seriously affected by statutory provisions, no definite
pronouncement can be made concerning the law of any jur-
isdiction without a careful examination of the applicable
statutes of that jurisdiction. In New York, for example,
although the lew situs rule has been codified by a statute
that declares that the ". ..validity and effect of a testa-
mentary disposition of real property, situated within the
state .. .are regulated by the laws of the state, without
regard to the residence of the decedent," 69 the common law
concerning foreign wills is radically changed. Concerning
wills executed outside of the state the statute provides that:
"A will executed without this state in the mode prescribed by
law, either of the place where executed or of the testator's
66 Id. § 251(3).
67 See 2 BFALE, CONLICT OF LAWS 973 (1935).
6sLarned v. Lamed, 98 Kan. 328, 158 Pac. 3 (1916).
69N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 47; see also Matter of Good, 304 N. Y. 110, 106
N. E. 2d 36 (1952).
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domicile, shall be deemed to be legally executed, and shall be
of the same force and effect as if executed in the mode pre-
scribed by the laws of this state, provided, such will is in
writing and subscribed by the testator." 70 Therefore, if a
will is in writing and subscribed by the testator, it will be
deemed valid and effective in New York, if it is valid either
by the law where executed or by the law of the testator's
domicile. Another section expressly provides that a will of
real property executed without the testator's domicile may
be admitted to probate in New York provided it is in writing
and subscribed by the testator.7 1 These various sections, of
course, are not inconsistent. Whereas Sections 22-a and 23
permit wills to be admitted to probate if executed in accord-
ance either with the law of the testator's domicile or of the
place where executed, Section 47 declares that the lew situs
shall be the governing law after the will has been admitted
to probate.
vII
SPANISH SACRAMENTAL WILL
As recently as May 1951, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit decided an interesting case which
again brought into the foreground some of the problems dis-
cussed herein. The case, entitled Melon v. Entidad Provincia
Religiosa De Padres Mercedarios De Castilla7 2 involved the
validity and effect of a sacramental will executed in Spain
and which purported to devise land located in Puerto Rico.
A sacramental will, in essence, is a religious oral will, and
although the privilege of making such a will was originally
conferred by Pedro II in the year 1283 upon the citizens of
Barcelona, the validity of such a nuncupative will has con-
tinued to be recognized by the Supreme Court of Spain.7
On July 7, 1937, Pantaleona Melon Saenz, being in ex-
tremis, declared in the presence of four witnesses that it was
7O N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 22-a; Cf. MODEL EXECUTION OF WILLS ACT § 7
(1940).
TIN. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 23.
72189 F. 2d 163 (1951).
7Id. at 164, n. 1.
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her will that her niece (one of the plaintiffs) should be her
only and universal heir. Pantaleona died two days later and
the will was duly proven as a sacramental will. It was re-
duced to writing and protocolized before a notary. Plaintiffs,
basing their claim of title to the Puerto Rican land in ques-
tion on the sacramental will, proven and protocolized,
brought an action to set aside the deeds pursuant to which
the defendants hold the land.
The District Court held that the sacramental will was
ineffective to pass title to the plaintiffs to the Puerto Rican
realty. On appeal the question was thus squarely presented
whether the law of Puerto Rico would recognize as effective
to pass title to Puerto Rican realty, a foreign will the formal-
ities and proof of which did not comply with Puerto Rican
law. Although valid by the law of the place where executed,
it was clear that the will would not qualify as a valid Puerto
Rican nuncupative will since such a will would require five
witnesses,74 while in the will of Pantaleona only four wit-
nesses were present and only two testified. Although Section
10 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico provided that real prop-
erty is subject to the laws of the country in which it is
situated, plaintiffs relied upon Section 11 which reads: "The
forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public in-
struments are governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed." The court held that the reconciliation
of conflicting provisions of the Code was a matter to be de-
termined by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and that
that court has held that "... under the Civil Code of Puerto
Rico, which in this respect departs from the Spanish Civil
Code, the rule of leav rei sitae has been adopted to determine
not only the validity and effect of the provisions of wills
purporting to dispose of real estate in Puerto Rico but also
the formalities required in the execution of such wills and
the capacity of parties to make them." 7; The court stated:
"The American rule of lem rei sitae as it applies to the ques-
74 CnvL CODE oF PuERTO Rico § 650 (1930). See Melon v. Entidad Pro-
vincia Religiosa De Padres Mercedarios De Castilla, 189 F. 2d 163, 164, n. 2
(1951).
75 Supra note 74, at 166.
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tion with which we are here confronted is stated in Section
249 of the Restatement of the Law of Conflicts of Laws... 76
and under the rule the validity of the will of Pantaleona, in
so far as it purported to pass an interest in the Puerto Rican
realty, was to be determined by the law of Puerto Rico. Since
there was no compliance with the Puerto Rican Code concern-
ing nuncupative wills, the Spanish sacramental will was in-
effective to pass title to the plaintiffs as to the Puerto Rican
land.
VIII
IN RE SCHNEIDER'S ESTATE - THE REVIVAL OF RENVoI
Thus far no reference has been made to In re Schneider's
Estate,77 a case recently decided by the Surrogate's Court of
New York County, since the discussion was intended to
demonstrate the remarkable degree of unanimity that exists
in cases involving a devise of realty. The discussion has also
indicated that even in the realm of the interpretation of such
a devise, where a conflict of authority has existed, the highest
court of New York State has declared that all questions
arising from the devise are to be resolved by the lew loci rei
sitae.78 Although the 1952 Court of Appeals decision made
no reference to In re Schneider's Estate decided by the Sur-
rogate in 1950, this latter decision, nevertheless, warrants
serious examination.
In In re Schneider's Estate, the deceased, a naturalized
American citizen of Swiss descent, died domiciled in New
York County, leaving as an asset of his estate real property
located in Switzerland. By the terms of the will the testator
attempted to dispose of his property, including the Swiss
realty, in a manner-contrary to the law of Switzerland. This
resulted from the fact that the law of Switzerland confers
upon one's legitimate heirs a legitine, being an indefeasible
right to a specified portion of a decedent's property. Since
the legitire entitles the heir to a substantial part of the
76 Ibid.
77 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.- Y. S. 2d 652 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd upon reargament,
198 Misc. 1017, 1030, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
78 See note 45 spra.
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estate and since it cannot be divested by testamentary act,7 9
the disposition in the Schneider case seemed clearly illegal
under the Swiss law although it would have been valid under
New York law. Inasmuch as the administratrix had liqui-
dated the foreign realty and had transmitted the proceeds to
New York, the court considered the fund as a substituted res
and proceeded to ascertain the validity of the original devise.
The opinion commenced in an entirely conventional
manner by stating: "Actions concerning realty are properly
litigable only before the courts of the situs." 80 In order to
direct the distribution of the fund (representing the Swiss
land), the court stated that "... reference must be made to
the law of the situs, as the question of whether the fund shall
be distributed to the devisee of the realty under the terms of
the will is dependent upon the validity of the original devise
thereof ... which must be determined under the law of the
situs of the land itself." Il Up to this point the reader would
still believe that the devise was illegal under "Swiss law,"
but the court made the following inquiry:
... [T] he court is confronted at the outset with a preliminary
question as to the meaning of the term "law of the situs"--whether
it means only the internal or municipal law of the country in which
the property is situated or whether it also includes the conflict of
laws rules to which the courts of that jurisdiction would resort in
making the same determination. If the latter is the proper construc-
tion to be placed upon that term, then this court must, in effect, place
itself in the position of the foreign court and decide the matter as
would that court in an identical case.82
After having put the reader on notice by this inquiry
which injected the doctrine of renvoi into the case, the court
stated that . .. the rights which were created in that land
are those which existed under the wqhole law of the situs and
as would be enforced by those courts which normally would
79 NUSSBAUm, AsmucAx-Swlss PRrvAT IN TaATrIoNAL LAW 23 (1951).
80 In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 1019, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 652, 655
(1950).
81 Id. at 1017, 1020, 96 N. Y. S. 2d at 656. For the latter proposition the
court cited Monypeny v. Monypeny, 202 N. Y. 90, 95 N. E. 1 (1911), and
Matter of Del Drago's Estate, 287 N. Y. 61, 38 N. E. 2d 131 (1941), rev'd
on other groiads, 317 U. S. 95 (1942).
821n re Schneider's Estate, supra note 80 at 1020, 96 N. Y. S. 2d at 656.
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possess exclusive judicial jurisdiction." 83 The Surrogate,
after stating that the precise question presented (viz.,
whether the law of the situs implies a reference to the entire
law of the situs including its conflict of laws rule) was one
of first impression in the State of New York, held that " ... a
reference to the law of the situs necessarily entails a refer-
ence to the whole law of that country, including its conflict
of laws rules." 84 The Surrogate categorically rejected the
statement found in the New York case of Matter of Tall-
madge "r that "renvoi is no part of the New York law" 8" and
stated that the law of New York is "in agreement with the
principle stated in ... the Restatement . . 87 of the Con-
flict of Laws. Although the Restatement otherwise rejects
renvoi,88 the doctrine is accepted in matters affecting title to
land and questions concerning the validity of a decree of
divorce.8 9
Since it was clear that the Court would apply the whole
law of Switzerland, its attention was called to the Swiss-
American treaty of 1850 90 which specifically provided in
Article VI that: "Any controversy that may arise among the
claimants to the same succession, as to whom the property
shall belong, shall be decided according to the laws and by
the judges of the country in which the property is situated."
This treaty provision did not disturb the court nor did it call
for a different solution than the one the court proposed to
apply. The court said that it ". . .merely directs, as does
the common law of this State, that initially a reference must
be made to the law of the situs. But the conflict of laws
rules and the rules concerning the rights and privileges of
foreign nationals and domiciliaries are as much a part of the
83Id. at 1021, 96 N. Y. S. 2d at 656 (emphasis added). The theory of
renvoi accepted by the Surrogate is generally referred to as the "substitution"
theory. See Note, Renvoi Revived, 31 B. U. L. REv. 69, 75 (1951).84 In re Schneider's Estate, supra note 80 at 1022, 96 N. Y. S. 2d at 657.
85 109 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336 (Surr. Ct. 1919).
861d. at 711, 181 N. Y. Supp. at 345 (emphasis added).
87 1,; re Schneider's Estate, supra note 80 at 1023, 96 N. Y. S. 2d at 659.
RESTA MENT, CONFLiCt OF LAWS § 8(1) (1934).88 RsTATEm-NT, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 7 (1934).
89Id. § 8.
90 11 STAT. 587 (1850).
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'laws' of the situs as are its internal laws .... ,, 91 The court,
therefore, from an examination of the authorities and ma-
terials submitted by the expert witnesses formed its conclu-
sion 92 that under the facts of the case "the Swiss law would
refer a matter such as this to the New York internal law,
under which law the will is a valid disposition of the testa-
tor's property." 93 The court, therefore, held the devise to
be valid and ordered that the proceeds from the sale of Swiss
realty be distributed to the devisee notwithstanding the in-
validity of such a devise under Swiss internal law.
IX
MEANING oF "LEX" RE-EXAMINED
Without prolonging the discussion unduly, it is clear
that by the stratagem of renvoi in the Schneider case the
Surrogate applied New York law to a devise of Swiss realty.
Actually there is a serious question as to whether the court
properly construed the Swiss law since the result has been
severely criticized by authorities on Swiss law both here and
abroad. 94  What is significant is the court's revival of the
renvol doctrine 95 and its specific application in a New York
decision. Although much has been written about the doc-
trine 9 it has been generally understood that renvol is
9 1 In re Schneider's Estate, supra note 80 at 1025, 96 N. Y. S. 2d at 660.
92 See N. Y. Civ. PpAc. Acr § 344-a pursuant to which a trial or appellate
court, in its discretion, may take judicial notice of foreign law.
93 In re Schneider's Estate, supra note 80 at 1026, 96 N. Y. S. 2d at 661.
94 See NUSSBAUm, AmERICAN-Swiss PRivAm INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 et
seq. (1951). Prof. Nussbaum, discussing the power to acquire and dispose
of property, stated that "[t]he situation . . . has recently and unexpectedly
become even more complex and confused by a juridically elaborate decision of
a New York Surrogate's Court." Id. at 121. For discussions in foreign legal
periodicals see footnote 76 in Prof. Nussbaum's American-Swiss Private In-
ternational Law. In footnote 77 he states: "In the present case, renvoi was
not pleaded by the parties. The court was apparently misled by an excess of
theoretical study."
95 See Griswold, Renvoi Revi ited, 51 HAgv. L. REv. 1165 (1938); Cowan,
Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical Fallacy, 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 34 (193) ;
Griswold, A Reply to Mr. Cowan's Views on Renvoi, 87 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
257 (1939).96 Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Ques-
tions in the Cmnflict of Laws, 14 So. CALr. L. lZv. 221 (1941); Falconbridge,
Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 C.. B. RE-. 369 (1939);
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not a part of the American law of Conflict of Laws.9 7  This
view of the state of the law seemed to be well supported by
judicial decisions.98 The Schneider case, however, is a warn-
ing beacon indicating that the renvoi doctrine is not dead. 99
It would seem unduly facile to urge that most of the dis-
cussion by the Surrogate concerning the law that would
govern a devise of foreign realty was dicta since in fact the
court was not dealing with foreign realty but with a fund
having a New York situs. Whether or not one would agree
with the conclusion of Mr. Sommerich that the decision was
"thoroughly practical and eminently sound," 100 there can
be no question that the decision warrants serious considera-
tion.101 It is clear that the decision has stirred up "the
hornets' nest of renvoi." 102 Again ancient discussions will
become current. If the reference is to the whole law of the
foreign country, and the conflict of laws rule of that country
makes reference to the "law" of another country, is this latter
reference to the "whole" law or only to its internal law?
Obviously if we are to avoid the "circulus ineaxtricabilis" re-
ferred to in Matter of Tallmadge 103 one of the references
Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine and the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of the
"Law of a Country," 27 YALE L. J. 509 (1918); Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory
and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 CoL. L. REv. 190 (1910); Schreiber,
The Doctrine of Renvoi, 31 HARv. L. REv. 523 (1918).
97 STUMBERG, PSiNCiPLES OF CONFLiCT OF LAWS 11 n. 28 (2d ed. 1951).
98Although Matter of Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336
(Surr. Ct. 1919), was the opinion of a referee, it was approved by the Sur-
rogate and involved a complete discussion of the problem and the authorities.
See also Apton v. Barclay's Bank, Ltd., 91 N. Y. S. 2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1949),
revld on; other grounds, 276 App. Div. 910, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 1, aff'd, 301 N. Y.
601, 93 N. E. 2d 495 (1950); Lann v. United Steel Works Corp., 166 Misc.
465, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 951 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Gray v. Gray, 87 N. H. 82, 174 Atl.
508 (1934).
99 In this connection, see Mason v. Rose, 176 F. 2d 486 (2d Cir. 1949)
(where the court made a reference to the whole law of England), and In re
Zietz' Estate, 198 Misc. 77, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 442 (Surr. Ct. 1950) (where Sur-
rogate Frankenthaler, who decided the Schneider case, referred to the whole
law of Austria).
100 Sommerich, 126 N. Y. L. J. 1304, col. 2 (Nov. 20, 1951).
101 See 26 N. Y. U. L. REv. 201 (1951); 50 COL. L. REv. 862 (1950); 64
HARv. L. RPv. 166 (1950).
1
02 In Mason v. Rose, 176 F. 2d 486 (2d Cir. 1949), Judge Frank, who con-
curred in the decision of the case, strongly regretted that the decision rested
on the renvoi doctrine. He wrote: "In the present case, where we all agree
on the result . . . I think we should be wary of unnecessarily stirring up the
hornets' nest of renvoi along the way." Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
103 109 Misc. 696, 712, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336, 346 (Surr. Ct. 1919).
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must be to the internal law of some jurisdiction. In the
S&hneider case the merry-go-round of references came to a
halt at an early stage in the chain of references since the
court concluded that the Swiss court would refer the matter
to the New York internal law. If this doctrine is to be im-
plemented in the future, it is fair to guess that this is the
manner in which it will be done.
X
CONCLUSION
As is indicated by the foregoing discussion the doctrine
of renvoi is perhaps the sole serious factor that injects a real
element of uncertainty in future cases dealing with a devise
of foreign realty. The lea' loci rei sitae rule, as explained
previously, enjoys a long history of application and the ap-
proval of countless authorities. It is not likely that it will
be easily displaced by a new or different interpretation of
the word lex-as to whether it refers solely to the internal
law of another jurisdiction or also to its conflict rules. The
conventional rule and the manner of its application can be
observed in the Melon case. 10 4 The 9chneider case indicates
what is a possible result if the forum chooses to implement
the doctrine of renvoi.
It does not seem likely that courts will readily relinquish
the existing clarity and harmony of decisions in favor of the
promised uniformity 105 that theoretically would result from
the application of renvoi. Nevertheless, any sound predic-
tion as to the result in a given case must now seriously con-
sider the threshold question whether the forum will apply
renvoi. It is hoped that the highest court of the state will
soon have the opportunity to pass authoritatively upon this
question and put at rest the many doubts that have been
recently revived.
Apart from the application of renvoi, from an examina-
tion of the cases and the commentaries, it becomes evident
104 See note 72 mzpra.
105 See Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Htav. L. REv. 1165, 1190 (1938).
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that in matters affecting the disposition of local realty, a de-
viation from the lew situs rule requires a local statute which
expressly changes the existing rule. As in the case of other
statutes clearly in derogation of the existing common law
such statutes are likely to be strictly construed. In no event
would a transfer be tolerated which would be void or against
the land policy of the situs. It is perhaps accurate to say
that, only with the most minor qualifications, Mr. Hening
correctly summarized this entire body of law as follows: "To
secure the expeditious and safe transfer of titles to real estate
it is far preferable that the law of the situs should be indis-
criminately applied to all wills of real estate." "o6
10 See note 31 supra.
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